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I. Ethiopian-Somalis: From Subjects to Citizens?1
When asked by an interviewer whether he felt more Somali or more
Ethiopian, Sultan Korfa Garane Ahmed, a federal member of parliament representing part of Ethiopia’s Somali Region, diplomatically
responded: “I am an Ethiopian-Somali.”2 The MP’s self-description as
an Ethiopian-Somali highlights two crucial implications for the analysis of contemporary politics in what was formerly known as the Ogaden and is today referred to as the Somali Regional State or simply
Region 5. For the first time in the history of the Ethiopian empire-state
or, more precisely, since the forced incorporation of the Somali inhabited Ogaden into Ethiopia at the end of the 19th century, the Somalis
are officially recognized as one of the country’s “nations, nationalities
and peoples.” Since the accession to power of the Ethiopian People’s
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) in May 1991, attempts to
forge a distinct “Ethiopian-Somali” or “Somali-Ethiopian” identity
have superseded the former regimes’ patronizing attitudes toward the
country’s “subject nationalities.”3
Throughout history Abyssinia and Somalia were perceived as two
diametrically opposed collectives, identities, and principles.4 In stereotypical yet politically instrumental terms, Ethiopians and Somalis
identified themselves as opposites in linguistic (Semitic vs. Cushitic),
religious (Christian vs. Muslim), economic (settled cultivators vs.
transhumant pastoralists), and political (hierarchical feudalism vs.
egalitarian segmentary kinship) respects. From Ahmed Ibrahim
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al-Ghazi’s (Gran or Gurey) 16th century jihad against highland Ethiopia to Mahammad ‘Abdille Hasan’s Dervish fighters at the end of the
19th century and from the Somali-Ethiopian Ogaden war (1977–78) to
the recent presence of Ethiopian troops in Somalia’s Gedo, Bay, and
Bakool regions, Ethiopians and Somalis generally viewed one another
as members of mutually exclusive social universes. This holds particularly true for those Somali clan lineages that inhabit and migrate
within the 250,000 km2 territory of Region 5. The invention of an Ethiopian-Somali identity thus bears symbolic significance, as it had hitherto been regarded as something out of the question. In addition, to
the critically minded observer, Sultan Korfa’s statement raises a second problem: despite their newly found status as Ethiopian citizens,
the political destiny and identity of the Somalis inhabiting Ethiopia’s
southeastern lowlands remain heavily contested.
For the researcher this entails the difficulty of circumventing the
antagonistic and politicized narratives that dominate the discourse
about and explanations of the Somali Region.5 As we shall see, the
idea of an Ethiopian-Somali identity represents only one (and a heavily disputed) position in a broad spectrum of identifications. If Ethiopian-Somali identity remains disputed, the lenses through which this
problem has been apprehended have themselves evolved over time.6
Between Somalia’s independence in 1960 and state collapse in 1991, the
“Ogaden problem” was mainly perceived as a colonial legacy clashing
with the pan-Somali agenda of reunifying all Somali inhabited territories.7 The Somali government spoke of Ethiopian occupation and
colonization (Somali Democratic Republic 1974), while Ethiopians contested the idea of a “Greater Somalia” and the validity of its neighbor’s
nationalist claims.8 In international political forums the Ogaden was
framed and addressed by Ethiopianists as an international border dispute between sovereign nation-states.9 With the demise of the Somali
state and the internal rearrangement of the Ethiopian state in 1991,
politics in the Ogaden took a new twist. Somalia unwillingly lost its
irredentist claim, while the new Ethiopian regime extended an invitation to Ethiopian-Somali leaders to participate in the organization of a
new ethnically based regional state.
Although fifteen years have passed since the end of the militarysocialist Derg regime led by Mengistu Haile Mariam, our review of
the political and institutional dynamics in the Somali Region demonstrates that the issue of Ethiopian-Somali self-determination, within
or outside the Ethiopian framework, is far from settled. As we shall
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argue, for political, economic, and genealogical reasons, EthiopianSomalis are torn between integration into Ethiopia, independence on
the basis of the right to self-determination, and the irredentist claims
of the now defunct Somali Democratic Republic to Somali-inhabited
territories beyond its borders. This article argues that the recognition
of an Ethiopian-Somali polity has neither translated into democratic
or effective working relations between the federal government and its
Somali regional state nor, for that matter, increased mutual appreciation between highland Ethiopians and Somalis. In the first section of
the essay, we review important developments in the formal political
arena of the region since 1991, with a special focus on party politics. A
second section looks at how the new principle of “ethnic federalism”
was implemented and how it affected Ethiopian-Somalis in Ethiopia’s
Somali region. The third part outlines the federal government’s interventions and evolving agenda towards its Somali periphery. Fourthly,
we discuss the contested political identities of Ethiopian-Somalis
alluded to in the introduction. Finally, this article concludes with a
discussion of the historic continuities and ruptures of the relations
between highland Ethiopia and its Somali subjects-cum-citizens.
II. 1991: A New Beginning
Ever since the 1977–78 Ethiopian-Somali war, the Somali region has
remained a theatre of political turmoil. Following the war, an estimated 800,000 Ethiopian Somalis crossed the border to neighboring
Somalia, where they lived in refugee camps for the next decade and a
half.10 But the victory of Ethiopia over its Somali and Western Somali
Liberation Front (WSLF) adversaries did not lead to an effective pacification of the area. The international media departed with the official
end of the inter-state war, affording the Derg regime a free hand in
meting out a brutal dose of civilian abuses. Counterinsurgency campaigns against remnants of Somali and Oromo guerrilla groups culminated in the forcible relocation of local inhabitants into restricted
villages, indiscriminate aerial bombardment, and “fragmented wars”
between armed proxy groups.11 During the early 1980s, the Ogaden
was rendered a vast military zone. Ethiopian-Somalis often allude to
the Derg’s rule over the Ogaden and the associated absence of social
development as corresponding to “30 military camps and one high
school.”12 A short-lived façade of stability at the beginning of the 1980s
was rudely disturbed by the 1983–84 famine. Deprived of traditional
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livelihood mechanisms of cross-border movement, trading, and cultivation, the Ogaden population plunged into a famine situation long
before the whole country in 1984.13 In the meantime, the fortunes of the
WSLF started waning when President Siyaad Barre, in a bid to save his
failing regime, signed a peace agreement with Mengistu Haile Mariam
in Djibouti in April 1988.
By the time the EPRDF took charge in Addis Ababa in May 1991,
the Somali Region was once again in a state of political confusion. State
collapse, famine, and civil strife in neighboring Somalia had led to a
massive influx of Somalis who sought refuge in the Ogaden region. By
mid-1992 an estimated 594,000 refugees and 117,000 returnees found
their way to the northern part of the region.14 The Derg had not left
a workable institutional framework that was capable of guiding the
region out of the mounting political and humanitarian crisis.15 It was
against that backdrop that the EPRDF had a hard time identifying the
right people and organizations to invite to the July 1991 Addis Ababa
transitional conference. In the absence of a bona fide Ethiopian-Somali
representative organization, the EPRDF allocated three seats to WSLF
and one seat to the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). Despite
Meles Zenawi’s prolonged stay in Mogadishu in the 1980s, he did not
give the Somalis much say in deciding who should represent them at
the transitional conference. The little influence they enjoyed in shaping the future of nascent federal Ethiopia was also illustrative of their
internal divisions.16 This said, the Somali Region for the first time experienced a period of political pluralism during the Transitional Federal
Government (TFG) as a multitude of clan-based political parties came
to the scene, beginning to jockey for power and influence. In the first
half of the 1990s, more than a dozen parties established their headquarters in Jigjiga, leading to a situation that an observer jokingly
remembered as follows: “There were so many party flags in town, you
could have thought it was the United Nations.”17
The first regional government was formed by the ONLF, which
won over 60% of the parliamentary seats in the June 1992 elections.18
Technically speaking, the reign of the ONLF, headed by Abdullahi Mohamed Saadi, lasted barely a year. The next two presidents
belonged to the WSLF or were independent candidates associated with
the ONLF on grounds of a shared genealogical background. The ONLF
regime, reflective of the failure, crisis, and contradictions of the WSLF
leadership and agenda in the 1980s, was characterized by uncertainty,
disorganization, and a haphazard groping for direction. Most of the
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first cabinet’s time was spent in Addis Ababa on the pretext of getting acquainted with the TFG and attempting to secure the region’s
budget.19 Like the exiled WSLF officials, these returnee politicians had
hardly any knowledge of the issues that mattered to the local people.
From the start, the mismanagement of public resources, a narrow focus
on pursuing sectarian interests, and a general lack of responsiveness
toward the population were characteristic traits of governance in the
Somali Region. Yet it was not these shortcomings but the request for
exercising the right to self-determination (i.e., secession from Ethiopia)
by the Ogaadeen-dominated regional assembly in February 1994 that
provoked the harsh intervention by the federal government.20
The year 1994 marked a turning point for the Somali Region both
in terms of its internal power balance and its relations with the federal
government in Addis Ababa. With the forced removal of the ONLF
administration, led by President Hassan Gire Qalinle, the honeymoon
between EPRDF and nationalist Ogaadeen Ethiopian-Somalis came
to an acrimonious end. The formation of the Ethiopian Somali Democratic League (ESDL) by ten non-Ogaadeen political parties in early
1994 corresponded to the delayed establishment of an EPRDF affiliate
party in the Somali Region.21 Behind the scenes and in anticipation of
ONLF’s secessionist agenda, the EPRDF had since 1992 devised a strategy for containing the ONLF.22 The circumstances of ESDL’s creation
were symbolic since the party was inaugurated in the Hurso federal
military camp (near Dire Dawa) in the presence of then-Prime Minister Tamrat Layne.23 However, while the ESDL benefited from federal
support and capacity building in administrative respects, its creation
was a direct response to what the non-Ogaadeen political parties perceived as ONLF hegemony. While ONLF took the right to secession
enshrined in the Transitional Charter (FDRE Constitution Article 39) at
face value, the ESDL “maybe more than others, understood the limits
of democracy proposed by the regime.”24 The ESDL won a landslide
victory in the 1995 elections by securing 76 (out of 139) seats in the
regional House of Peoples’ Representatives and 15 (out of 23 accorded
to the Somali Region) in the federal one.25 Splits within the ONLF, an
election boycott by the ONLF’s “hawks,” and the swift rearrangement
of electoral constituencies to the disadvantage of the Ogaadeen clan
aided the ESDL’s electoral victory.
From the Ethiopian perspective, EPRDF’s alliance with the ESDL
marked the appearance of a number of moderate and secular Ethiopian-Somali politicians in the region’s political scene. Among them
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was the late Abdulmejid Hussein, chairman of the ESDL and its successor, the Somali People’s Democratic Party (SPDP), as well as a minister
and a senior U.N. and Ethiopian diplomat. The influential “ambassador,” as he was commonly referred to, was trusted by leading cadres of
the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). Other senior pro-EPRDF
Ethiopian-Somali politicians who gained prominence during the past
decade are Shemsudin Ahmed, Abdulrashid Dulane, Dr. Mohamed
Sarhaye and Mahmoud Dirir. All of them were at one time ministers or
ambassadors for the federal government and executives in the central
committee of the Somali Region’s ruling party. As political brokers
loyal to the EPRDF they represented federal interests at the regional
level and regional demands at the federal level, thereby constituting
a vital political link between the federal and regional capitals, Addis
Ababa and Jigjiga. Through their endorsement of EPRDF’s political
agenda they obtained federal backing in the region’s internal power
struggles. Conversely, ever since the arrival to power of the ESDL in
1994, the Somali Region’s senior politicians have been mostly perceived as “a surrogate of the Addis Ababa federal government.”26 In
reality, dependence on federal support also meant that the center could
remove regional cabinets and presidents loyal to the EPRDF whenever
they “digressed from EPRDF’s agenda.”27 Consequently, dismissals
of senior politicians and administrators became a recurrent practice
within the Somali Region. Since 1991, nine successive presidents have
headed the regional government.28
The ESDL’s fortunes as the ruling party did not last for long. A
rift between Somali Region President Eid Dahir Farah and various
members of the party’s executive committee considerably weakened
the League and eventually led to Eid’s dismissal and imprisonment.
By the end of 1997, the ESDL had discredited itself in the eyes of the
Ethiopian-Somali public and had lost the support of federal representatives.29 The party’s disorder allowed federal authorities to decree
a merger between the legal ONLF and the remnants of the ESDL.
In June 1998, the ESDL and legal ONLF elected 35 members to represent them at the founding convention of the new Somali People’s
Democratic Party (SPDP). The replacement of the ESDL by the SPDP
signified a broadening of the pro-EPRDF alliance within the Somali
Region through the inclusion of moderate Ogaadeen politicians. Even
so, the SPDP has been “wracked by infighting and political disputes.”30
Commentators have described the SPDP as incompetent and “corrupt
beyond description.”31 By 2004, the party’s lack of popular support was

30

Tobias Hagmann and Mohamud Hussein Khalif

widely apparent. Many in the region considered the SPDP a creation of
the EPRDF and its leaders handpicked by the latter.32 In reality, Region
5’s ruling party represents a loose pro-EPRDF umbrella under which
intense political and genealogical competition is played out.
Through its government-aided machinery, the SPDP successfully
mobilized voters in the 2000 and 2005 national and 2004 district elections. The 2004 district elections revealed a de facto one-party state in
the Somali Region under the banner of the SPDP. This was in stark contrast to the region’s first multi-party elections to the regional assembly
of 1992, which were seen as an example of political pluralism.33 Out
of a total of 3,309 district councillors elected across the region, 3,182
belonged to the SPDP, 21 to the opposition Western Somali Democratic
Party (WSDP), and 106 were independent candidates.34 In the disputed
2005 national and regional elections, the SPDP won 161 mandates in
the regional parliament (out of 183) and all the region’s seats in the
federal House of Representatives.35 Part of the SPDP’s electoral success
and political predominance is due to the effective instrumentalization
of state administration and resources for political purposes. Additionally, the party benefited from the establishment of a system of government-appointed and paid elders at regional, zonal, and district levels.
These lataliye or amakari elders (“advisor” in Somali and Amharic,
respectively) were appointed throughout the Somali Region on the
initiative of the federal government at the beginning of 2000. They
function as a parallel organizational framework to the formal government structure, from the district up to the regional levels.36 Apart from
assisting local government in matters of peace and security, they have
been instrumental in campaigning and mobilizing voters during election periods.37 The integration of elders and community leaders into
government was primarily motivated by the Ethiopian state’s need
to extend government control into rural pastoral areas. Government
officials rightly conceived of elders as bearers of intimate knowledge
of the clan lineages they represent and of being capable of mobilizing their communities.38 Lataliye elders thus act as quasi-governmental
administrators who disseminate official policy among the population
and inform bureaucrats about the latest developments within their
communities.
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III. Ethnic Federalism in the Somali Frontier
In the Somali Region the project of state expansion is still at a comparatively embryonic stage. Statistical data on the region’s population and livestock are highly unreliable, no geographic map exists that
indicates the actual boundaries of administrative units such as zones
and districts of the region, and bureaucratic monopolization of public
affairs is very limited.39 Ethiopian-Somalis often point out that “the
government does nothing at all for us”40 and that effective administration is confined to a few urban centers like Jigjiga or Godey. State
institutions are unable to hold a monopoly on violence, raise taxes, or
provide basic public services. They thereby enjoy little legitimacy in
the eyes of rural pastoralists. From a historic perspective, the Ogaden
is one of Ethiopia’s frontiers where state penetration has always been
much weaker than in the central highlands.41 During the first half of
the 1990s, the incumbent regime had recognized the need to set up an
effective administration at the district level as a means to expand state
control and counter insecurity in Region 5.42 But despite grandstanding rhetoric, the devolution of state power and finances to the region’s
fifty-three districts has been mainly theoretical. This said, the EPRDF’s
policy of “ethnic federalism”43 has partly altered politics within the
region.
The granting of self-rule to Ethiopian-Somalis within Ethiopia’s federal architecture decisively transformed local politics. While outsiders
have tended to interpret the internal dynamics of Region 5 exclusively
in terms of “tribalism,” and “clannishness” as “the categorical imperative of Somali political practice,”44 regional politics go beyond identity
politics. Rather, three parallel phenomena have characterized the Ethiopian-Somali polity in the past one-and-a-half decades.45 First, political authority in the Somali Region is predominantly neo-patrimonial.
It involves federal and regional patrons who are close to the EPRDF
and its SPDP surrogate leaders as well as clients who seek protection
and support from their patrons.46 This neo-patrimonial rule is animated by the coexistence of a politicized, segmented patrilineal kinship structure on the one hand and a legal-rational local government
and bureaucracy on the other. As a result, rotations, dismissals, and
changes within regional, zonal, and district executive branches have
been common ever since 1991.
Second, the hand over of the region’s administration to Ethiopian-Somalis resulted in an acute competition for control over state
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resources. Political leaders, namely, the urban-based elite, usually with
the support of their respective lineage groups, fought over administrative appointments. They did so primarily to access public budgets.
Benefits to be gained included salaries, public contracts, control over
security forces, and per diems for various ad hoc tasks.
Third, like the rest of the country, major political decisions within
the Somali Region are made and implemented through the ruling party
structure rather than by representative institutions such as parliament
or local government councils. Although an “actual overlap in personnel and functions”47 between political party, administration, and parliament exists, occupying an important position in the party hierarchy
provides more decision-making power than the holding of office.
From the establishment of the region until its first-ever district elections in February 2004, zonal and district administrators and village
chairmen were appointed through a top-down process. Senior politicians at the regional level nominated their clients—usually persons
loyal to the ruling party and representing the dominant clan lineage
within a given territory—as local government officials. In the 2004
local elections each district elected a council including a spokesman,
vice-spokesman, administrator, and vice-administrator. These councils are charged with managing budgets and development activities
within their respective constituencies. Despite the intention of creating representative institutions at district and regional levels, elections and appointments in Region 5 follow the careful pre-selection
of candidates by party leaders. It is only after party endorsement that
candidates will mobilize popular support from members of their locality and clan lineage.48 While the ruling party (now SPDP, previously
ESDL and ONLF) ensures political and ideological conformity from
its headquarters in Jigjiga to the remote countryside, elders defend the
interests of their lineage by lobbying for recruitment of their kin. As
a result, nominations, elections, dismissals, and substitutions of local
administrators in the Somali Region occur at the interface of party and
genealogical interests. Senior government posts at the regional level
(notably the heads of line bureaus) are all occupied by followers of the
ruling party. Although the holders of these posts frequently rotate, a
certain clan balance reflecting the approximate demographic size of
the region’s clan groupings is respected in the apportionment of these
treasured positions.
Since 1991, ethnically defined administration in Region 5 has mostly
been understood as exclusive rule by a dominant group. Political
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representation was equated with a clan lineage’s unchallenged control over its home territory. While clan “home” areas exist in Somali
society, their borders are neither static nor definite, because pastoral
production relies on mobility and flexible resource use arrangements,
which changed over time. The establishment of a decentralized administration under the EPRDF embraced the delineation of districts and
kebeles (the smallest administrative unit in the Ethiopian political system) and their assignment to a distinct lineage. Violent land conflicts
driven by the motive of territorial control rather than actual resource
use thus becomes increasingly apparent.49 A case in point is the massive conflict between various sub-clans of the Reer Abdille sub-branch
of the Ogaadeen and the Sheekhaash clan, which sought to establish
its own district in East Imi in the Afder zone at the end of the 1990s.
Repeated confrontations claimed several hundred casualties and had
led by 2003 to the displacement of 14,000 persons.50 The restructuring of the administration on an ethno-national basis was especially
disadvantageous to (agro-)pastoral groups that shared a joint SomaliOromo identity, such as the Gabra, Garre, Jarso, Guura, or Guji. Prior to
decentralization, strong alliances existed between Oromos and Somalis
who rallied around a common Muslim-Cushitic identity and a joint
struggle against highland domination. Somali-Oromo brotherliness in
the eastern lowlands was decisively disrupted when communities had
to settle for affiliation with either the Somali or the Oromiya region
and, concomitantly, a Somali or Oromo identity.51 Numerous districts
and kebeles along the Somali Region’s border are disputed between the
Somali, Oromiya, and Afar regions. After a referendum on the status
of over 400 kebeles along the Somali-Oromiya border in October 2004,
Somalis accused their regional administration of betraying Somali
interests by “illegally transferring” land to the neighboring Oromiya
state.52 Government representatives have presented these border disputes as a problem between local inhabitants. In actual fact, party and
state officials as well as armed liberation movements have incited and
nurtured these ethno-political conflicts by providing money, weapons, and political support to their respective Somali and Oromo kin
groups.53
IV. Federal Interventions and Security Concerns
The Ethiopian-Somali elite has been plagued by divisiveness and has
lacked political finesse as well as bureaucratic skills ever since assum-
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ing control over the region in 1991. However, if public institutions
have failed to live up to people’s needs and rights, internal political
disorder is not the sole explanatory factor. Rather, the federal EPRDF
regime regularly used coercive tactics in federal-regional interactions
and increasingly intervened in regional matters in the course of the
past decade. To be sure, both the imperial government and the Derg
had, in typical centralist manner, regularly indulged in micromanaging politics in the Ogaden. Contrary to the authoritarian nature of the
past regimes, the TFG charter promised ethno-national self-government and thus raised expectations for more autonomous decision-making. At the beginning of EPRDF rule, federal meddling in Somali state
affairs was rather minimal. After consolidating its power throughout
the country and following the Somali call for secession in 1994, EPRDF
partly reverted to its predecessors’ domestic policy in regard to the
Somali periphery. National security concerns slowly but surely began
to override the new rulers’ initial reform agenda toward the “backward
region.” This included the containment of Somali nationalism and irredentism, pre-emption of Islamic fundamentalism, and safeguarding
access to the region’s unexploited natural energy reserves.54 Perhaps
the most effective strategy by the central government has been the skilful exploitation of competition and differences among the region’s clan
lineages. The numerically smaller non-Ogaadeen groups voluntarily
accepted federal patronage with the aim of gaining influence in the
region.55 They managed to prevent the restoration of exclusive Ogaadeen rule following the downfall of the first ONLF administration in
the mid-1990s. Unwittingly, they undermined regional autonomy by
inviting the federal government to assume a position of arbitrator in
the domestic game of clan rivalry and factionalism.56 Ethiopian-Somalis’ inability to unite politically clearly benefited federal authorities.
It allowed the continuation of the central government’s tradition of
pitting one clan (or an alliance of Somali clans) against another. This
provided a cost-effective way of exerting control over the vast Somali
inhabited lowlands, where federal presence to this day is limited to
military garrisons.
Upon further examination, federal interventions in the Somali
Region go beyond simple divide-and-rule policies. Federal interests
are ensured through subtle dealings within and outside the official
channels linking federal and regional organs, as well as through outright dictation of policy and the threat or application of force. Federal
authorities, specifically the Ministry of Federal Affairs, have developed
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variegated tactics to secure influence over the Somali Region’s internal politics.57 These tactics operate at different levels and bring into
play institutional, bureaucratic, political, financial, and military means.
The most direct federal interventions were the successive removals
of regional presidents and senior politicians. Only three of the nine
regional presidents came to office through an election. The rest were
handpicked and later ousted, either directly or with the blessing of
EPRDF cadres in the federal government.58 Counterinsurgency campaigns against the “anti-peace elements,” as ONLF fighters are euphemistically called, represented another form of direct federal action.
Army officials and regional militia have been involved in persecuting
ONLF cadres and sympathizers ever since the fallout between ONLF
and EPRDF in 1994. A striking parallel exists with the neighboring
Oromiya region, where state-organized repression of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) has reached significant dimensions among the
population.59 In the case of the ONLF, the federal government pursued
a double strategy. On the one hand, it isolated the more militant wing
of ONLF and its allies from the political process, while concomitantly
backing moderate Ogaadeen and non-Ogaadeen political interests. On
the other hand, regional and federal security forces used military force
against ONLF rebels and suspected sympathizers. Since the ONLF’s
adoption of small-scale guerrilla warfare, both sides regularly claim
victories in battles against their enemies. Although these claims are not
confirmed by independent sources, it seems as if the ONLF is getting
stronger in recent years, partly because of Eritrean military assistance.
Between 1998 and 2001 more discrete influence in regional decision making occurred through the deployment of “technical advisors.”
Senior TPLF/EPRDF cadres of the Ministry of Federal Affairs were dispatched to “advise” regional presidents and bureau heads in the country’s peripheral regions.60 In Region 5, these party cadres ensured that
their host state toe the line of the central government in all important
policy matters. After a protest by regional administrations, the practice
of dispatching federal advisors to regional capitals on a permanent basis
was halted.61 However, the EPRDF continues to co-steer Somali Region
affairs through its cadres, federal ministry bureaucrats, and through
intellectual guidance—or rather political indoctrination—of SPDP and
state officials. Another seemingly technical practice that allows federal
authorities to have power over Ethiopian-Somali officials is gem gema,
which roughly translates into criticism and self-criticism. Gem gema is
used in meetings, particularly of the ruling party, whereby officials are
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made to admit to committing unlawful acts, including corruption and
other conduct unbecoming of a government official.62 The strategic
value of this process is that it creates a criminal record for important
politicians, thereby making them vulnerable to public ridicule and susceptible to federal pressures. In addition to these administrative procedures, federal authorities purposely maintain direct relations with the
region’s influential clan elders. Elders are canvassed in order to counterbalance the state administration, particularly in order to increase
pressure on the regional administration to implement policies advocated by federal authorities.63 Through convocation of town hall meetings in Jjgjiga, EPRDF officials have attempted to bring elders into the
management of the Somali Region’s most pressing problems, namely
decentralization, regional border disputes and, time and again, insecurity. Many elders enjoy a kind of popular legitimacy and independentmindedness that the region’s top officials have lacked.
Countering Islamic fundamentalists has become another cornerstone of the EPRDF’s agenda in dealing with its southeastern lowlands. Over the past decade, the central government has maintained
a rhetoric of imminent dangers posed to Ethiopia by adherents of AlItihaad al-Islami (Islamic Union). Al-Itihaad had been created in the
late 1980s by circles of Islamic study groups and Muslim Brotherhood
cells, which were mainly composed of young, Saudi-educated Somali
clerics following a puritanical salafist interpretation of Islam.64 Al-Itihaad established a branch in Region 5 in mid-1991 and was initially
registered as a legal political party. Frictions between the TFG and
Al-Itihaad appeared when the latter gradually militarized its activities and followers in 1992. Although several militant Somali Islamic
organizations had appeared after the downfall of the Siyaad Barre
regime, Al-Itihaad was the only group to pursue a truly regional and
military strategy within the Somali-inhabited Horn of Africa.65 The
EPRDF’s reaction to Al-Itihaad was as swift as it was violent. Between
1992 and 1996, Ethiopia successfully destroyed Al-Itihaad’s military
capabilities within Region 5, but also in the Gedo region of neighboring Somalia. With the advent of the U.S.-led “war on terror” in the
aftermath of September 11 and speculations about al-Qa’eda cells in
Somalia, the Ethiopian government was quick to label Al-Itihaad a
terrorist organization and, on occasion, claimed that they had enlisted
the financial and material support of foreign Islamists.66 The government tried to exploit the global anti-terrorism discourse by portraying
its ONLF and OLF armed opposition as terrorist organizations to the
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domestic and international audience. By joining the global coalition
against terrorism, the EPRDF secured American economic and military
aid. By the end of 2003, U.S. marines had established small outposts,
so-called “lily pads,” within the Somali Region where they monitor the
Ethiopian-Somali border and implement minor development activities
intended to win the sympathies of the local population.67
V. Between Integration, Independence, and Irredentism
Fifteen years after the establishment of the Somali Regional State and
the official introduction of the concept of a “Somali nation” within the
Ethiopian body politic, the question is to what degree, if at all, an Ethiopian-Somali identity has materialized. The constant flux of political
developments in the Somali Region and the Horn of Africa as a whole
defies sweeping generalizations on the topic. Bear in mind the proviso
that one can distinguish between more exogenous and more endogenous narratives on the identity of Somalis in Ethiopia. Collective
identity is a dynamic phenomenon, which is constantly constructed,
deconstructed, and reconstructed. Therefore, it is of importance to consider the totality of narratives, external and internal, pertaining to a
group’s identity. How do outsiders apprehend the political orientation,
actual and desired, of Region 5’s inhabitants? As the guarantor of ethnic federalism, the EPRDF federal government obviously propagates
the maxim that Somalis are able to develop and promote their own culture and political identity while expressing allegiance to the Ethiopian
state. Conversely and despite the official rhetoric, the majority of nonSomali highland Ethiopians views all Somalis (whether living within
or outside the country’s territory) as alien to Ethiopian nationhood.
The Ogaden war is vividly remembered and Somalis are often portrayed as Ethiopia’s enemies. The Somali civil war and state collapse
have enforced popular clichés of Somalis being an “anarchic,” “dangerous,” and essentially “unreliable” people. The external recognition
of an Ethiopian-Somali identity within Ethiopia is thus confined to the
advocates of ethnic federalism, i.e., the politico-bureaucratic state elite.
Similarly, while a multitude of opinions exists among members of
the global Somali diaspora,68 most reject the possibility of a distinct
Ethiopian-Somali identity. In regard to the region’s political fate, the
diaspora is divided between adherents of a more pan-Somali nationalist orientation and defenders of Ogaden self-determination. Those
belonging to the first category consider Region 5 as part and par-
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cel of the colonially divided Somali nation and therefore refer to the
Somali Region as Western Somalia (Soomaali Galbeed). In contrast, Ogaden nationalists advocate self-determination on the basis of the entire
Somali inhabited territory within Ethiopia. As a contributor to an
online chat forum pointed out, “there is nothing called Somali galbeed,
it is Ogadenia.”69 These narratives on Ethiopian-Somali, Ogaden, and
Western Somali collective identity indicate the multiple and contested
interpretations of who Somalis in Ethiopia are and who they might be.
These divergences constitute the background for much of the region’s
divided political leadership. The result is a fragmented polity that
ranges from a minority sentiment of belonging to the Ethiopian nationstate, to a strong drive for independence as fought for by the ONLF, to
economic integration with parts of neighboring Somalia.
Overt pledges of allegiance to the Ethiopian nation-state by Ethiopian-Somalis are exceptional, often made with an ulterior motive and
mostly restricted to members of the region’s ruling party and bureaucracy. Irrespective of the official idiom of “Ethiopian-Somaliness,” economic and social integration into the Ethiopian highland economy
characterizes some peripheral enclaves within the Somali region. Thus
the Somali (-Oromo) agro-pastoralists of what was formerly known
as East Hararghe, a territory stretching from the slopes of the Harar
highlands to the confines of today’s Jigjiga zone, are more strongly
involved in trade and exchange with the Ethiopian highlands than
Somalis inhabiting the Haud and Ogaden plateau.70 Moreover, communities living along the historic trade route between Harar and the
port of Berbera in adjoining Somaliland share a sense of attachment
to the Ethiopian highlands. The smaller Darood and Dir clan lineages
inhabiting the northeastern fraction of the Somali Region have generally opted for a more conciliatory position towards the EPRDF government. Arguably, they have done so because they fear marginalization
by sectarian Ogaadeen nationalists, rather than due to sympathy for
Ethiopian ethnic federalism.
The ONLF is the most prominent organization advocating selfdetermination and ultimately independence for Region 5, or, as it
calls it, “Ogadenia.” The ONLF’s origin is traced back to divisions
that emerged during the 1980s within the region’s historic liberation
front, the WSLF.71 The ONLF was clandestinely established in August
1984 in Mogadishu. ONLF’s current deputy-chairman, Mohamed
Ismail, proclaimed its formation, in 1986 in Algiers, as an opposition
in exile, “accountable only to the people of Ogaden and independent
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of any government in Mogadishu.”72 Contrary to the WSLF, which
had sought reunification with Somalia, the ONLF demanded a popular plebiscite to decide whether “Ogadenia” should remain within
Ethiopia, merge with Somalia, or aim for independence. Many of the
ONLF’s founders had been educated in the 1960s and 1970s in Arab
countries and some of them pursued Baathist and Islamist tendencies. They distanced themselves from the older WSLF nationalists who
had grown up during the heyday of Somali nationalism in the 1940s
and 1950s and whose understanding of politics was strongly parochial and clientelistic. The ONLF advocated a more dogmatic program
based on Ogaadeen particularism. Initially, The ONLF concentrated on
expanding and consolidating its organizational structure among the
diaspora, where it deliberately recruited educated younger members
of the Ogaadeen clan. In the mid-1980s, parts of ONLF also connected
with radical Islamists of the future Al-Itihaad, who shared a similar
aversion to pan-Somali nationalism rooted in genealogical interests.73
Via the massive wave of returnees to the Ogaden following Somalia’s disintegration, the ONLF managed to establish a presence within
the territory it sought to liberate. After falling out with the EPRDF and
subsequent military confrontations, the ONLF split into different factions in 1995. The “hawks,” under the leadership of Sheikh Ibrahim
Abdallah, took up armed struggle in the bush. A smaller faction, led by
Bashir Abdi Hassan, sought a direct arrangement with the pro-EPRDF
ESDL, while a third group of Ogaadeen intellectuals and businessmen aimed at a negotiated arrangement with the ESDL, while keeping
ONLF’s organizational autonomy. Since the “outlawed” ONLF took to
the bush, the organization’s further development has become rather
opaque. The EPRDF succeeded in fragmenting the ONLF by engaging its more moderate members in negotiations and into the region’s
patronage and spoils system. This in turn radicalized the hard-liners
within the ONLF, who managed to gradually increase their military
strength and expand their operations in the past decade. The ONLF’s
top leaders, including Chairman Admiral Mohamed Omar Osman,
reside in Western countries such as Denmark, Germany, and the U.K.
Their fighters operate a predominantly hit-and-run insurgency in Fiq,
Korahe, Degehabur, Wardheer, and Godey zones of the region. In these
areas the ONLF mostly draws on the popular support of members of
the Ogaadeen clan lineages of Mohammed Zubeyr, Bah Gerri, Makahil, and Tolomogge. With the help of this grassroots support, it is able
to control the movement of people and goods in these areas. While
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the ONLF’s military activities are limited, its network of informants
and sympathizers covers almost the whole Somali Region. The ONLF
claims to represent all Somalis living in Ethiopia but, in actual fact,
most non-Ogaadeen do not support the ONLF, which they view as
primarily defending the interests of Ogaadeen lineages. However, it
would be wrong to assume that ONLF benefits from the unconditional
support of all Ogaadeen. At any given point in the post-1991 era, Ogaadeen politicians and elders have defended positions across the entire
political spectrum. The pro-EPRDF administrations in the region, from
the ESDL to the SPDP, all included strong Ogaadeen representation. In
recent years criticism of the ONLF has increasingly been expressed by
Ethiopian-Somalis who question the expediency of pursuing an armed
struggle instead of a political solution through negotiations with the
federal government.
Political conditions since 1991 have not been conducive for Somalia’s
irredentist claims to the Ogaden or an Ethiopian-Somali movement for
reunification with Somalia. Over a dozen Somali peace processes have
failed and Somali faction leaders have proven unable to reconcile and
restore effective authority.74 In the continuous absence of an effective
Somali central government and Somaliland’s secessionist drive, the
quest to reunify all Somali-inhabited territories under one state has
become temporarily moot. However, the collapse of the Somali Republic resulted in an unforeseen “Greater Somalia,” not on the basis of a
political, but instead an economic integration. The complete privatization of trade, transport, and finance boosted the free flow of goods,
services, and information within the Somali-inhabited territories.75
Region 5 is firmly embedded in this larger Somali political economy.
Contraband smuggled into the region from Somaliland, Puntland, and
central Somalia mainly consists of non-perishable food items, clothes,
and electronic and consumer goods. In return, qat (a mildly narcotic
leaf), livestock, and vegetables are exported along the trade routes connecting the Ogaden with Somalia’s commercial centers.76 The Somali
and Somaliland shilling are widely used in the Somali Region as a
parallel currency to the Ethiopian birr, which, although backed by the
central government, is not available in large enough quantities. Crossborder kin distribution further connects the regions’ inhabitants to
neighboring Djibouti (the Issa and Gadabursi), Somaliland (the Gadabursi and Isaaq), Puntland (the Harti), central Somalia (the Hawiye,
Marehan, Digil, Mirifle, and other kin groups) and northeast Kenya
(groups belonging to the Daarood family as well as others). Although
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the interactions within these clan territories are not irredentist in the
conventional sense, they shape to a considerable degree EthiopianSomali identity as members of a Somali common economic market.
VI. Continuities and Ruptures in the Ogaden
With the introduction of ethnic federalism, Ethiopia’s Somali Region
underwent yet another twist in its intricate relations with the central
government of Ethiopia and the Ethiopian highland. From the imperial
governments of Menelik to Haile Selassie and from the Derg dictatorship of Mengistu Haile Mariam to the EPRDF’s revolutionary democracy under Meles Zenawi, politics in the Ogaden have been repeatedly
reconfigured, but have shown continuities that have transcended the
various regimes. At the core of these continuities is the Somali Region’s
character as a frontier space where the state’s judicial and bureaucratic
forms of control have encountered rejection and outright resistance.
The Somali Region is among Eastern Africa’s “pastoral fringe regions”
that continuously challenge the national political structures of the central state.77 The clash manifested between the Ethiopian state bureaucracy and Somali segmentary society is, however, not a zero-sum game
between incompatible elements. As research from other parts of the
world demonstrates, state institutions and clan-based kinship have
their own historicity, are highly interrelated, and are mutually constitutive rather than exclusive.78
Several continuities have marked the Ethiopian-Somali frontier
since its annexation by the Ethiopian empire. First, state penetration
has remained weak, with state institutions enjoying little legitimacy or
significance for local communities. Somali elders manage community
affairs on the basis of a customary cosmology, conflict resolution practices, and intergroup contracts (xeer). Second, the federal government
exerts direct control and influence over the Somali Region via its military garrisons as well as indirect rule through the region’s ruling party.
The central state employs the stick more often than the carrot in trying
to integrate the Somalis into the Ethiopian nation-state. Lastly, armed
resistance to the “habesha” (highland rulers) and their Somali allies
carries on in the form of the ONLF’s insurgency. The Ogaadeen rebels
build upon popular frustration with the EPRDF government’s deceptive promises of genuine Somali self-determination and democratization. Beyond these permanencies, different rulers and regimes at the
center of the Ethiopian state have transformed relations with its Somali
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periphery and the politics therein. To clarify, the following phases of
Ethiopian rule in its Somali-inhabited territory can be differentiated.79
Between 1850 and 1920, governance in the Ogaden was characterized
by a fiscal-military mode. The region was victim to predatory behavior by imperial soldiers who collected taxes and livestock by raiding
Somali pastoralists. In the second phase, between 1920 and 1977, the
central government partly replaced the military-fiscal mode with an
effort to increase bureaucratic control over the region from the center.
Selective repression continued, but the imperial government increasingly engaged in patrimonial relations with loyal Ethiopian-Somali
leaders and clan groups who were co-opted into the provincial administration.
The period between 1977 and 1991, under the Derg and following
the traumatic Ogaden war, was dominated by systematic repression
of Ethiopian-Somali dissent and resistance. Garrison socialism and
counterinsurgency strategies made the inclusion of Somalis into local
governance impossible. In the most recent phase, since 1991, Ethiopian-Somalis have directly administered their regional state within a
federal framework. As this article argues, this democratic experiment
reverted to more manipulative interventions by federal authorities in
the mid-1990s. Today the central government applies a mixture of patrimonial and coercive tactics that are a reminder of the second phase
(1920–1977) of Ethiopian rule over the Ogaden.
To conclude, Geshekter’s prognosis, made two decades ago, that
“an Ethiopian state whose rulers permitted Somali self-determination would implicitly consent to its own territorial disintegration” has
proven quite accurate.80 Although Ethiopian-Somalis formally enjoy
autonomy and self-government, the EPRDF has made sure that political developments within the region do not depart from its agenda.
Behind the curtains of decentralized democracy, federal authorities call
the tunes, with the regional government as the involuntary conductor
faced with an increasingly frustrated Somali audience.
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